African Gunners of World War 2

The Anti-Aircraft Defence of East Africa

Click here to access the Index of East African Anti-Aircraft Artillery Units.

The development and deployment of anti-aircraft artillery in East Africa went through a number of phases, each driven by a different need (and a different enemy).  These were:

- protection of Mombasa as a port for the disembarkation and assembly of forces for the offensive against Italian East Africa,
- defence against raids by Japanese naval forces, including carrier-based aircraft,
- the occupation of Madagascar,
- provision of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank units for the 11th (East Africa) Infantry Division,
- anti-aircraft reinforcements for the war against the Japanese in Burma, releasing British troops,
- ongoing defence of East Africa.

Italian East Africa and East Africa Force

An appreciation of the threat of Italian air attack should Italy enter the war was sent to the British High Commissioner in South Africa in May 1940, for discussion with the South African leader, General Smuts.  It was thought that the Italians would not attack to the south, i.e. Kenya, but would prefer to attack Aden and Djibouti (French Somaliland) given the deployment of bomber aircraft to Massawa and Assab in Eritrea.[1]

Instead, the Italians were preoccupied with the Sudan, lightly defended by the British.  In the first three weeks of the war, declared by Italy one minute after midnight on 11th June 1940, Italian air activity was restricted to a reconnaissance missions and light bombing attacks on border towns.

The situation in Kenya in June 1940 bore resemblance to that in Sudan.  There were very troops for defence of an enormous expanse of territory.  The vital areas – broadly those on the route of the Mombasa-Nairobi-Uganda railway – were a long way from the frontier with Italian-occupied Ethiopia.  Perhaps the most vital asset in Kenya was the deep-water port at Mombasa.  It provided an alternate route to Egypt, via road, rail and river which, although slow, acted as an insurance policy should the Italian have closed the Red Sea.  When the Italian threat to Kenya receded, the country geared itself up to become a base for an offensive into Italian East Africa.  In the meantime, Mombasa remained vulnerable to attack, being defended only by infantry and with no anti-aircraft defences.[2]

As early as December 1940, South Africa had offered a brigade group for service in Kenya, if it could be equipped by the British.  Although the offer was not immediately accepted, partly out of fear of provoking the Italians, in March 1940, General Smuts informed the British that a brigade group would be ready to leave South Africa by the end of June.  In addition, up to three fighter squadrons and an anti-aircraft brigade (the equivalent of a regiment) would also be available, if the British could provide the equipment.  The first element of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Brigade, S.A.A. duly arrived at Mombasa on 1st June.  This unit, the 1st A.A. Battery, under Major G.W. Meister, was equipped with eight obsolete 3-inch heavy anti-aircraft guns.  The 2nd and 3rd A.A. Batteries, equipped only with twin Lewis machine guns, and the 1st Searchlight Battery, arrived on 8th June.  The primary role of these units was to provide protection for the disembarkation of the South African and West African ground forces.  These were the beginnings of the meaningful air defence of Mombasa.  The 1st A.A. Brigade was joined by the South African 2nd A.A. Brigade in September 1940.[3]

With the successful conclusion of the East African campaign, the South African forces were now withdrawn as reinforcements for Egypt.  The 1st A.A. Brigade arrived in Egypt in early May 1941, and in late August 1941, the 2nd A.A. Brigade embarked at Massawa for Port Tewfik.  With the departure of the South Africans, once again the air defences of Mombasa were reduced to light machine-guns manned by the infantry.[4]  

Japanese Action in the Indian Ocean

No sooner had the Italians been disposed of, then another enemy emerged with the Japanese entry into the war in December 1941.  With Japanese advances seemingly unstoppable, it was feared that the Indian Ocean coast of Africa would come under threat once again.  In January 1942, the G.O.C.-in-C., East Africa, General Sir William Platt, wrote to the War Office requesting ‘information and guidance’ regarding the coast and anti-aircraft defences for Mombasa.  The first response in February 1942,  was confirmation of the imminent despatch of coast defence searchlights to be installed in support of existing coast defence artillery positions.  In March, it was noted that eight heavy and eight light anti-aircraft guns might be issued shortly, with which local units might be trained pending the arrival of additional reinforcements.[5]

The Manpower Problem and ‘Africanisation’

The conclusions of an assessment of the options for expanding the anti-aircraft force in Kenya were communicated by General Platt to the War Office on 4th March 1942.  The General proposed that forty percent of the personnel required for one heavy and one light anti-aircraft battery could be provided by African gunners (‘Africanisation’), if six months were allowed for training.  Much more time would be needed should additional units be required or should the proportion of African personnel forming each unit be increased.  An alternate option, with limited ‘Africanisation’, was for the inclusion of local British women in the units, a solution which had already been applied successfully within the United Kingdom air defence organisation.  Platt went on to say, however, that given the preference was for light anti-aircraft units to be mobile, women would be excluded from these – as to why, he does not say.  Whatever, the case, the General advised that Mombasa could not be left defenceless for over six months, and that one heavy and one light battery should be sent from the United Kingdom at an early date.  He further recommended that the rank-and-file personnel despatched should be ‘high grade’, as these would later become the N.C.O.s and key men for additional units raised or ‘Africanised’ in Kenya.  The actual decision on ‘Africanisation’ and the inclusion of women could be deferred after the arrival of the two batteries.  The inclusion of local personnel in an expanded anti-aircraft force would be essential not only to the expansion of the force but to the future release of British personnel for deployment elsewhere.[6]

The War Office responded quickly and on 12th March confirmed its intention to send one heavy and one light anti-aircraft battery, with equipment and just over 500 personnel.  While the personnel would provide gun-crews in an emergency, their primary roles would be training and providing the basis upon which to form additional, local units.  These units, subsequently confirmed as the 162nd H.A.A. and the 76th L.A.A. Batteries, R.A. with eight heavy and eight light guns, would be despatched on convoy WS 18.[7]

The assessed threat to Mombasa was seen as: air raids of up to thirty carrier-based aircraft; brief bombardment by cruisers with 12-inch or lesser guns; ‘smash and burn’ raids carried out by small landing forces.  On 21st March, in light of Japanese successes in the Far East, a worst-case scenario was proposed by the War Office whereby the Japanese employed all their carriers simultaneously, giving a scale of attack of around 100 fighters; 150 torpedo bomber sand 150 dive bombers (this proved to be an accurate forecast of Japanese capability and intent when Colombo was attacked by the Kidō Butai carrier strike force in early April).  In addition, shore bombardments might now be undertaken by battleships with 14-inch guns.  A landing might be undertaken by a force equivalent to a brigade group.  To defend against the air threat, sixteen heavy and twelve light anti-aircraft guns were thought to be needed, supported by six searchlights. [see also 8106-7 re Dar-es-Salaam] [8]

Reinforcements from Britain

Convoy WS 18 sailed from the Clyde on 15th April, carrying the 162nd and the 76th Batteries.  After a stopover in South Africa, the convoy headed northwards into the Indian Ocean.  The troopship carrying the anti-aircraft batteries for Mombasa, the Empire Woodlark, detached from the convoy on 30th May and arrived at Mombasa the next day.  Further reinforcements would soon be on their way.[9]

In April 1942, following a decision to use Kilindini, Mombasa as a temporary base for main units of the Royal Navy, it was decided to increase the antiaircraft defences with the addition of one heavy and one light anti-aircraft regiment (twenty-four and thirty-six guns respectively).  In May, General Platt made the case for the appointment of an overall anti-aircraft commander, given the proposed increase in anti-aircraft defences and the probability of at least a partial occupation of Madagascar.  Consideration was given by the War Office to diverting to Mombasa guns intended for Addu Atoll already en route with convoy WS 17.  It was decided that these guns should go to bolster the defence of Ceylon, where Colombo would continue to be the main base for the East Indies Fleet.  Additional anti-aircraft guns for Mombasa could not be despatched to arrive before July.  On 14th May, the War Office signalled its intention to send in convoy WS 19, the Headquarters, 19th A.A. Brigade, the 123rd H.A.A. and the 96th L.A.A. Regiments, R.A. (both static units), together with the Headquarters, ‘F’ A.A. Regiment, R.A. (the latter was to be re-designated as an East African Artillery unit on arrival and was to command the 162nd H.A.A. and 76th L.A.A. Batteries, R.A.). [10]

On 18th May 1942, the War Office signaled General Platt that he should define the expansion programme for anti-aircraft artillery in East Africa, using the soon to arrive 162nd H.A.A. and 76th L.A.A. Batteries as a nucleus, in consultation with the Brigade Commander, Regimental Commanders and Inspector General, all of whom had details of the West African expansion scheme.  On 3rd July, Platt outlined the plan for the development of the East African anti-aircraft artillery.  This would give 65 percent ‘Africanisation’ of all three regiments under the 19th A.A. Brigade, including the 162nd H.A.A. and 76th L.A.A. Batteries.  This would enable the initial requirement agreed earlier to be met with in addition, two light anti-aircraft batteries for the field formations (what would become the 11th (E.A.) Infantry Division).  It was thought that nearly all the required British Officers and N.C.O.s could be found from within the 19th A.A. Brigade.  There was also the question of the British 154th H.A.A. Battery, 238th L.A.A. Battery and the 145th L.A.A. Troop, at that time still deployed on Madagascar.  On 28th July, the War Office confirmed that the two L.A.A. units were to remain at the disposal of East Africa Command for ‘Africanisation’, whilst the 154th H.A.A. Battery, R.A. was to be retained as-is with a view to it eventually re-joining its parent regiment, the 52nd, which was now in Ceylon.[11]

The ship carrying the 19th A.A. Brigade personnel arrived at Mombasa on 14th July and the men disembarked the next day.  Also disembarked were eight 3.7-inch static guns and twenty-four 40mm Bofors light anti-aircraft guns.  The Brigade Headquarters may have come under the command of the H.Q. Fortress Mombasa.[12]

Under command were:

- ‘F’ Regiment, R.A.,
- 123rd H.A.A. Regiment, R.A.,
- 96th L.A.A. Regiment, R.A.

Additional guns were unloaded from the City of York on 24th July: four 3.7-inch static guns and four mobile 3.7-inch guns.[13]

Creation of the East African Anti-Aircraft Artillery

The Brigade now initiated the training of African gunners which began at the newly established Anti-Aircraft Training Centre (A.A.T.C.) at Shimo-la-Tewa on 23rd July 1942.  The creation of ‘Africanised’ batteries, with a mixed war establishment of British Officers, British N.C.O.s and African gunners, involved as a first step the creation of ‘cadre’ units of British Officers and N.C.O.s from the personnel of the recently arrived Royal Artillery units.  Surplus personnel left over from the creation of these cadres were temporarily posted to other British units.  One by one, the cadres moved to the A.A.T.C. for training where they were joined by African gunners who had undergone basic training.  This combined establishment then learned how to work together and trained in the specifics of the anti-aircraft role.  Once completed, these units emerged as fully-fledged East African batteries of the East African Artillery.  At this stage, the British batteries which had donated the cadres were disbanded, being redesignated as (or absorbed into) one of the E.A. batteries.  For example, the 76th L.A.A. Battery, R.A. formed two cadres – the 1/76th and the 2/76th Batteries.  Following the process outlined above, the personnel of the 2/76th Battery were posted away as the 201st (E.A.) L.A.A. Battery on 15th October.  The 201st Battery - the first ‘Africanised’ anti-aircraft battery - left the A.A.T.C. on 24th October and went to Nyali Transit Camp, outside Mombasa.  The personnel of the 1/76th Battery moved to Shimo-la-Tewa on 24th October, where they were joined by African gunners on 9th November.  On 16th November 1942, the 76th L.A.A. Battery, R.A. was redesignated as the 202nd (East African) L.A.A. Battery, E.A.A.  By 31st December 1942, one H.A.A. regiment H.Q and two batteries and two L.A.A. batteries had been formed:[14]

- R.H.Q., 15th (E.A.) H.A.A. Regiment                             Mombasa
- 151st (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery                                          Mombasa
- 152nd (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery                                         A.A.T.C., Shimo-la-Tewa
- 201st (E.A.) L.A.A. Battery                                           Nyali Transit Camp, Mombasa
- 202nd (E.A.) L.A.A. Battery                                          A.A.T.C., Shimo-la-Tewa.

In terms of guns, by 7th November 1942, the authorized scale agreed for the East African mainland was 106 heavy and 76 light guns (36 of the latter being allocated for infantry brigade groups).  To date, 32 heavy and 72 light guns had been allocated.  East Africa Command (General Platt) was advised that it was unlikely that additional heavy guns would be allocated before April 1943.[15]

In December 1942, proposals for the organisation of all Royal Artillery in East Africa were drawn up and reviewed.  The command staffs proposed were:

- B.R.A. (Brigadier, R.A.) at East Africa Command H.Q., to deal with all Royal Artillery branches,
- C.R.A. (Commander, R.A.) located at Gilgil, responsible only for the training and  war establishments of the field artillery, and field artillery units on the East African mainland,
- C.C.A. (Commander Coast Artillery) East African Ports; located at either Tanga or Mombasa and responsible for the mainland coast artillery,
- A.A.D. (Anti-Aircraft Defence) Headquarters, located ta Mombasa, to replace the 19th A.A. Brigade and to be responsible only for the training, war establishments and operation of mainland-based anti-aircraft units,
- C.R.A. Islands Area, to be responsible for all artillery (all branches) located on the Indian Ocean islands, including Madagascar.[16]

Deployment to Madagascar

Of great concern to the British was any threat to the lines of communication across the Indian Ocean, whether that be East to India or North from South Africa to the Middle East.  As part of the buildup of the Eastern Fleet, a series of naval and air bases and refuelling stations were to be established between South Africa and Ceylon.  Madagascar lay across these lines of communication and since the Fall of France, had been in Vichy hands.  In late 1941, intelligence had been received that the Vichy Government had, under German pressure, agreed to Japanese occupation of the island.  Whether the Japanese would have taken this step or not, once Japan entered the war, the British prepared to remove the threat by undertaking a limited occupation of Madagascar, seizing the important port of Diego Suarez.  Operation ‘Ironclad’ began on 5th May 1942 and within a few days, Diego Suarez had been secured.  On 1st July, Madagascar was placed under General Platt’s command.[17]

The follow-up invasion forces had been accompanied by British anti-aircraft units: the 154th H.A.A. Battery, R.A.; the 238th L.A.A. Battery, R.A.; and the 145th L.A.A. Troop.  These units remained as part of the occupation force, and as seen above, by late July 1942 their future deployment away from Madagascar had been decided upon.  The relief of these units was to be undertaken by newly formed East African anti-aircraft units, as soon as these could be made ready.  By November 1942, a regimental headquarters and two heavy and one light battery had been formed and trained.  In January 1943, the 151st (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery, E.A.A. arrived at Diego Suarez to relieve the 154th H.A.A. Battery, R.A., which was sent to Ceylon.  This was followed later that month by the arrival of the 201st (E.A.) L.A.A. Battery, E.A.A. which relieved the 238th L.A.A. Battery, R.A., which moved to Mombasa.  In February, the H.Q. 15th (E.A.) H.A.A. Regiment, E.A.A., with the 152nd (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery, E.A.A., arrived to complete the East African anti-aircraft defence of Diego Suarez.  These units were withdrawn from Madagascar between June and October 1944.

Field Units – 11th (E.A.) Infantry Division

At the end of 1942, Wavell had suggested the use of African Troops in Burma and elsewhere in South-East Asia.  He thought that East African troops, being mechanised, could be sent to Ceylon to release British and Indian troops for operations in Burma.  With War Office approval, in February 1943 plans were made to send a West African division (the 81st) to India and to bring the East African 21st Brigade in Ceylon up to the strength of a division (the 11th East African), by the despatch of divisional units and additional infantry brigades as soon as they were ready.

The Divisional Headquarters, 11th (E.A.) Infantry Division formed on 15th February 1943 but it was not until 17th May that the H.Q. assumed full control of the brigades and units allotted to it (except for the 21st (E.A.) Infantry Brigade then serving in Ceylon).  Until May 1943, the Staff was attached to H.Q. Central Area, East Africa Command for training and formation.  The Divisional Commander, Major-General C.C. Fowkes, was appointed on 20th April 1943.[18]

The artillery component of the 11th Division began forming in around March 1943 and by May a divisional East African anti-tank regiment and a light anti-aircraft regiment had been formed.  The numbering of these regiments follows a confusing trail but in October 1943 this was finally settled upon, resulting in the 304th (E.A.) Anti-Tank Regiment, E.A.A. and the 305th (E.A.) L.A.A. Regiment, E.A.A.  Conforming to the organisation of artillery units then being deployed against the Japanese in Northeast India, the two regiments, yet to join the Division in Ceylon, exchanged batteries in February 1944.  What emerged was a combined anti-tank/light anti-aircraft regiment – the 304th – and an anti-tank regiment – the 305th.  The 304th Regiment left to join the 11th Division in Ceylon, the R.H.Q. and the 203rd and 204th L.A.A. Batteries arriving on 5th March 1944 to join up with the 101st and the 102nd Anti-Tank Batteries which had arrived earlier in October 1943.  The 304th moved to India with the Division where in September 1944 it was re-organised once again to become an anti-tank mortar battery.  It was in this guise that in October 1944, the Regiment entered Burma, participating in the 11th Division’s successful advance down the Kabaw Valley.  Withdrawn to India after the conclusion of the operation, on 2nd February 1945 the Regiment reverted to the war establishment of an anti-tank regiment becoming known once again as the 304th (E.A.) Anti-Tank Regiment, E.A.A.

The 305th Regiment remained in Kenya where on 1st March 1944 it converted to become a regiment of field artillery; the 308th (E.A.) Field Regiment, E.A.A.

The Wind Down of the Anti-Aircraft Force

By 31st March 1943, there were deployed in Kenya twenty-eight heavy static 3.7-inch A.A. guns and twenty-four light Bofors guns in and around Mombasa (primarily defending the port of Kilindini), supported by five Mk II R.D.F. sets.  By the end of June, this had changed to twenty-eight heavy static 3.7-inch A.A. guns and forty light Bofors guns.   In addition, there were four heavy and eighteen light guns at the Anti-Aircraft Training Centre, which moved from Shimo-la-Tewa to Athi River in March 1943.  Discussions now began as to the future reduced scale of anti-aircraft defences required.  In August, a revised defence plan, proposed that the anti-aircraft defence requirements for Kilindini, Mombasa were:    

- one H.A.A. Regiment H.Q.; three H.A.A. Batteries (eight 3.7-inch guns each)
- one L.A.A. Regiment H.Q.; one L.A.A. Battery (18 guns), one Composite Battery (four H.A.A, six L.A.A. guns).[19]

In September 1943, a reduced garrison for East Africa had been agreed; there were to be only two H.A.A. batteries (16 guns) and one light battery (18 guns), to be deployed primarily for the defence of Kilindini.[20]  By October 1943, the proposed deployments for the mainland were: sixteen heavy and 16 light guns at Kilindini; four heavy and six light guns to Tanga, a port city in Tanganyika (Tanzania).[21]  On 5th April 1944, the figures for guns to be deployed had been reduced to only sixteen heavy guns at Kilindini, with a mobile reserve of eighteen light guns.[22]

However, it seems to have taken until August 1944 before the agreed reductions were enacted.  During August and September 1944, the R.H.Q. 20th (E.A.) L.A.A. Regiment and four L.A.A. batteries – 201st, 202nd, 206th and 207th – were all disbanded.  The R.H.Q. 16th (E.A.) H.A.A. Regiment was also disbanded (30th September 1944), and the 151st (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery was withdrawn to Athi River (disbanded 10th November 1944).  From around 1st September, the Athi River anti-aircraft training centre became a general depot for all branches of the East African Artillery.[23]

The last remaining East African anti-aircraft unit in Madagascar, the 152nd (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery, was withdrawn to Kenya in late October.  Excluding the units allocated for service in S.E.A.C. with the 11th (E.A.) Infantry Division, by 1st November 1944 this left operational in Kenya only the 156th (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery, located at Mombasa.  When not at Athi River, the anti-aircraft artillery on the mainland was by now under the command of the Commander R.A. South in Nairobi.  The 152nd (E.A.) H.A.A. Battery remained at Athi River, equipped with eight 3.7-inch guns for training.  The by now surplus L.A.A. guns were all returned to the Ordnance Depot.[24]

Reinforcements for India

Given the wind down of anti-aircraft defences on the East African Mainland, and the proposed reduction to nil of anti-aircraft defences for the Indian Ocean Bases, East Africa Command was able to offer to South-East Asia Command either a heavy anti-aircraft regiment of three batteries, or a regiment consisting of two heavy batteries and one light, for service in India – this at a time when British manpower within S.E.A.C. was in serious need of reinforcement.  On receipt of this regiment, India would be able to withdraw a British regiment for disbandment to provide infantry replacements.  The H.Q. 11th Army Group in S.E.A.C. gratefully accepted this offer, confirmed in a signal dated 8th May 1944.[25]

The 15th H.A.A. Regiment, E.A.A., with the 153rd, 154th and 155th Batteries, embarked at Mombasa, Kenya, on 6th November 1944, on board the transport Salween for service overseas with South-East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.).  Disembarking at Chittagong on 2nd December, the Regiment came under the command of the 13th A.A. Brigade and was deployed at Chittagong and nearby Charinga and Feni.  Between 27th March and  20th August 1945, the 155th Battery was at Akyab.  The Regiment embarked at Calcutta for East Africa in October 1945.

Final Stand Down at Mombasa

On 3rd August 1945, the H.Q. R.A. East Africa Command authorised the withdrawal of all heavy anti-aircraft artillery from Mombasa.  The last remaining gun sites were to be closed down in the order: H2, H6, H3.  However, this did not take place immediately and the 152nd and 156th Batteries continued to man the gun sites into September 1945.[26]

Click here to access the Index of East African Anti-Aircraft Artillery Units.

13 January 2025



[1] East Africa A.A. and Coast Defence, WO 106/5213 [8147-8]

[2] “The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol 1”, Playfair, I.S.O., H.M.S.O. (amended 1974)

[3] ‘South African Forces World War II (Vol. I), East African and Abyssinian Campaigns’, Orpen N., Purnell (1968)

[4] South African history

[5] WO 106/5213 [8126-8]

[6] WO 106/5213 [8122-3]

[7] WO 106/5213 [8112]

[8] WO 106/5213 [8108, 8103, 8102]

[10] WO 106/5213 [8072, 8079, 8100, 8070]

[11] WO 106/5213 [8070, 8079, 8100]

[13] WO 169/7009

[14] WO 169/7009; War diary 76th L.A.A. Battery, R.A., WO 169/7017

[15] WO 106/5213 [8030]

[16] WO 106/5213 [8014]

[17] “The War against Japan, Vol 2”, Woodburn Kirby, S., H.M.S.O. (1958)

[18] Joslen

[19] WO 106/5213 [7966-78]

[20] WO 106/5213 [7962]

[21] WO 106/5213 [7958]

[22] WO 106/5213 [7948]

[23] War diary 20th L.A.A. Regiment, E.A.A., WO 169 18327; War diary E.A. (Athi River) Artillery Depot and Training Centre, E.A.A., WO 169/18318

[24] WO 106/5213; War diary H.Q. Southern Area, WO 169/18247

[25] WO 106/5213

[26] War diary H.Q. R.A. East Africa Command, WO 169/21696